

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING CONFIDENTIAL

POC 23-9

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Control: #368A

Recd: DECEMBER 10, 1965
1230

mv

ACTION:
POL

FROM: SURABAYA

ACTION NR: 197, DEC.9, 1965

INFO:
CHRON
AMB
DCM
ECON
RF
CAO
POL
RELAY

ACTION DJAKARTA 197, INFO DEPT 50

Joint sitrep 19

1. Security situation

A. East Java. General pattern unclear. On one hand in Kediri, where PKI mass following has been decimated, military reportedly seeking put stop to killing. On other, in Pasuruan, where PKI not completely cleaned up, military still reportedly turning its back and allowing Moslems continue slaughter.

B. Surabaya. Minor round-ups by army of PKI suspects continue and even may be picking up as result of Brig. Gen. Sunarjadi taking over East Java command from Basuki Rachmat. (In recent speech Surabaya garrison commander Lt. Colonel Munander became first East Java official to admit publically that Surabaya had become refuge for PKI fugitives.) At same time some indirect criticism of army for not really meeting this problem has begun. Evidently angered by military killing of Madurese, "KOPAS". (Moslem dominated "command for crushing Gestapu") In press statement declared that it public secret that Surabaya hiding place for Gestapu/PKI. "They can move freely here and so manage to provoke us against each other." East Java peasant front apparently motivated by same reason issued similar statement.

EEM
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HLH
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PFG
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Action Taken

12/10/65

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FFBC, Japan

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Control: PAGE 2

Recd:

Well informed PSI source offered possible partial explanation for delay in cleaning up Surabaya. Said East Java commands intelligence staff had been riddled with PKI sympathizers and severely crippled when they dismissed. Source asserted that competent intelligence staff needed to tackle problem of PKI in Surabaya.

There have been no reported clashes between Madurese and military since last sitrep.

2. Dismissals

A. Press Dec. 7 reported that East Java Dwikora executive had appointed supervisory team for Surabaya radio station and that four of stations principal officials had been arrested "for involvement in Gestapu". Since October Moslem press has been branding station as "Gestapu nest" and urging authorities take corrective action.

B. In visit to Surabaya Dec 6 Min. internal affairs Sumarno announced that over 5000 local officials in East Java, including members legislative councils, suspended since Oct. 1. Group hardest hit was village officials.

C. Sumarno also explained why one dismissal expected daily here by public has not taken place. He said only Pres. Sukarno has right dismiss East Java PKI deputy governor Satryo. Satryo known to be staying quietly at home.

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PAGE 3

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Recd:

D. East Java prosecutor office announced 60 prosecutors and admin employees had been purged.

3. Fleet day. I attended 6th anniversary Indo fleet Dec. 7 at Surabaya naval base, which highlighted by speeches delivered by Min. Defense Nasution and naval chief staff Mariadinata. While both attacked @KI they also, particularly Nasution, had plenty of harsh words for NeMolim. Nasution bluntly asserted anti-Malaysia efforts will continue and revolution will not move to right. There was "file by" of ships past wharf, which included two subs and cruiser West Irian. Several rockets fired from rocket launching mechanism on deck landing craft.

4. GSNI demand. Surabaya GSNI (PNI high-school affiliate) at recent conference demanded retooling coordinating minister for education Prijono.

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A-65

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : MEDAN, SURABAYA

FILE

Amembassy DJAKARTA

August 3, 1966

Conditions and Attitudes in East Nusatenggara

Mr. James Fox, an American anthropologist who has lived for the past year and a half on the island of Roti near Timor in East Nusatenggara, and his wife recently called at the Embassy on their way to Oxford University in England. Mr. Fox, assisted by his wife, gave the reporting officer an unusually perceptive and coherent account of political events and attitudes in East Nusatenggara. While some of Mr. Fox's observations apply only to East Nusatenggara, his account may also be regarded in many respects as a kaleidoscope of events in provincial Indonesia during the last tumultuous year. His observations on the suppression of the PKI, the killings and local attitudes toward the Army probably are applicable to much of the country.

Aftermath of the September 30 Movement. In Roti, where the Foxes actually lived, communist influence was strong only on the western end of the island. A few weeks before September 30, a Javanese communist named Sukirno arrived from Djakarta to take charge of the local Party. It is widely believed that Sukirno brought some kind of instructions for a local follow-up to impending developments in Djakarta and the Army has reportedly discovered a list of intended anti-communist victims in the area.

A small Army detachment arrived in Roti only in January or February to investigate "Gestapu" activities but limited their punitive actions to execution of Sukirno and the local PKI leader on Roti. The Army then withdrew but returned in mid-March. This visit resulted in the execution in Roti of between 40 and 50 local Roti communists plus another 30 communists from the nearby island

Group 3 - Downgrade each 12 yrs;
not automatically declassified.

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of Sawu. A third Army visit occurred in June resulting in the execution of one or two additional PKI members who had earlier evaded capture but had been apprehended in the interim.

These visits, especially the second (March) visit, gave rise to a feeling of great tension in the population and rumors were rife of executions far in excess of those that actually occurred. Rumors of widespread killings were rife throughout East Nusatenggara, in fact. Mr. Fox heard one western missionary from Timor report that some 30,000 people had been executed in that island. Since he felt that this figure was unreasonable, Fox traveled through Timor talking to as many people as possible and also sought information on executions in other islands of East Nusatenggara. He feels that approximately 800 persons, or at a maximum 1,000 persons, were executed in Timor, Sumba, Alor, Roti, Sawu and in other smaller islands comprising all of East Nusatenggara other than Flores. Mr. Fox had no reliable information on executions in Flores which, however, has several times the population of all the other islands of East Nusatenggara combined. Mr. Fox said that the PKI was better established in Alor than some of the other islands and that 105 communists were executed there, which was a higher proportion of the population than elsewhere. He said that the top communist in East Nusatenggara, Tobias Paulinus Rissi, is still alive and being held at the prison in Kupang. Rissi was First Secretary of the East Nusatenggara CDB and a member of the PKI Central Committee.

Attitudes Toward the Army. The image of the Indonesian Army has declined radically in East Nusatenggara since September 30. The area is largely Christian and contains a diverse assortment of non-Javanese peoples. The Army units that moved into the area since September 30 are composed of Moslems from Java and have seemed to the local population to be a foreign occupation force. The Army has apparently done little to overcome this initial liability and has acted in a heavy-handed manner without much regard for local sensibilities. According to Mr. Fox the Army engaged in sumptuous feasts day after day at the expense of the local population, resulting especially in a substantial depletion in the island's livestock (goat) population. In the provincial capital of Kupang, corruption was estimated to have increased ten-fold since September 30 and the Army, which no longer faced restraints from other power factors, was largely responsible. Several shiploads of rice from abroad that were unloaded in Kupang went into Army hands and could be purchased by the population only at exorbitant prices. Since periods of famine occur from time to time in different areas, the contrast between the high-living Javanese military forces and the local population was marked. The Army visit to Roti in March that took the lives of some 70 or 80 communists was followed, for example, by a period in April of considerable hunger.

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Attitudes Toward Portuguese Timor. Mr. Fox said there was considerable speculation before September 30 about a likely Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor within the not so distant future, that is, within the year. Mr. Fox emphasized that this was low-level speculation among junior officers and enlisted men and equivalent layers of the civilian bureaucracy rather than statements by responsible senior officials.

People in Indonesian Timor generally regard Portuguese Timor as a kind of paradise. This view is based primarily on the lack of consumer goods in Indonesian Timor and a considerable amount of smuggling between the two areas. Goods brought in from Portuguese Timor not only include superior versions of such everyday necessities as soap but also included cattle, which for some reason are plentiful in the Portuguese half of the island but not in the Indonesian half.

American Built Harbor. The harbor development near Kupang being constructed under an AID contract by an American firm was nearly completed when Mr. Fox left. Although the project was greatly admired by the local inhabitants because of the superior quality of the materials and facilities, it would probably not be usable since the harbor was located several miles from town and had neither drinking water nor adequate road connections with Kupang. Indonesian attempts to drill wells had failed due to a lack of modern equipment and little had been done to build an adequate road to the city. Both of these tasks were outside the scope of the AID project but the Indonesian Government had not been able to fulfill its side of the bargain. Mr. Fox observed that, prior to September 30, it was widely believed by the Indonesian population that the port was intended to be a staging base for an invasion of Portuguese Timor. (Mr. Fox was describing popular attitudes, and not necessarily official intentions, as he himself emphasized.)

Other Political Attitudes. Mr. Fox said that Protestant groups in East Nusatenggara had a lingering nostalgia for the old RMS or Republic of the South Moluccas that had rejected accession to the Indonesian Republic in 1950. Although this sentiment for separation from Indonesia and union with the Moluccas was an underlying attitude, there was no organized effort to pursue these aims as far as he knew. Protestants are concentrated in the western parts of Indonesian Timor and in Roti, incidentally, while the areas nearer to Portuguese Timor are Catholic. (Fox considered the eastern Catholic people near Portuguese Timor to be highly intelligent while the central group which was also Protestant was rather backward and "stupid.") In spite of the lingering RMS sympathy, Protestants in East Nusatenggara paradoxically tended to cooperate closely with the PKI because of their overriding fear of an Islamic state. The Catholics tended to cooperate with the Moslem parties and in general were much more reconciled to Indonesian nationalism.

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Although the Timorese hinterland is Christian, Kupang itself is composed largely of Javanese bureaucrats, most of whom are either genuinely or nominally Moslem. The FNI is still strong among Javanese or other non-Christian groups and, in Fox's opinion, was even more radical than the PKI before September 30. Fox believed that the reason for this phenomenon was that the PKI had consciously chosen to infiltrate its more radical members into the FNI while the regular PKI machine was handled as a more routine and bureaucratic operation. The FNI has not been purged since the September 30 affair and its organization remains largely intact including its more radical leaders, he said.

Miscellaneous. In discussing the area in more general terms, Fox said that the large island of Sumba was dry and very lightly populated. Timor too is not particularly fertile and has a relatively low population density. Flores is the most fertile, most heavily populated and most developed island in East Nusantara. Although it has three times the population of all the rest of the province, it could support a much higher population yet. In Dutch times, Flores lagged behind the rest of the area in education and population skills but this trend has more than been reversed in recent years.

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Department of State

INFO : HONG KONG, MEDAN, SURABAJA

Ambassy JAKARTA

May 4, 1966

Example of Anti-Chinese Propaganda

Hong Kong's 1940 to Department

Enclosed is the full text of an Angkatan Persendjata article of April 25 linking the Chinese Communists with the September 30 Movement. The article is an interesting example of one important strand in the semi-official Indonesian propaganda stance regarding the September 30 Movement. The exact mixture of ingredients in the Indonesian description of the September 30 Movement tends to shift somewhat from time to time depending on the propaganda needs of the moment and the particular objective of a given article. As Consulate General Hong Kong observes in regard to the particular article in question, truth is often a minimal factor in adopting a given line.

In the first five months after September 30, the Indonesian Army and many associated civilian groups were motivated in their propaganda by a desire to (a) protect Sukarno, at least temporarily, from being identified publicly as the prime mover of the September 30 Movement or even to obscure insofar as possible any identification of Sukarno with the events of October 1 and (b) pin the blame on Sukarno's principal organizational support internally and on his closest ally externally. This led in the first instance to almost complete overt concentration on the PKI as the villain although there was already a secondary

Enclosure:

1. Newspaper article

GROUP 4

Downgrade after 3 yrs.; automatically declassified after 12 yrs.

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POL:KEMasters

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implicit theme that various pro-Communist groups and individuals around Sukarno such as the then PNI leadership and Subandrio were involved along with the Chinese. As time has passed, the charges by anti-Communist groups against internal and external enemies other than the PKI have become progressively more explicit and overt and have reflected both tactical needs and a belief that the whole pro-Communist movement with its external supports should be considered guilty "in principle" whatever the specific details of their involvement might be.

Furthermore, there has been a strongly felt need to divert attention from Sukarno/^{to} the forces around him for tactical reasons. This has caused a pronounced distortion of the evidence released publicly (although the truth of Sukarno's guilt is widely accepted privately). The search for scapegoats has accordingly led to such secondary factors as Subandrio and Peking. Objectively, there is little evidence that Subandrio was an important figure in the specific events of October 1 although he was undoubtedly informed about the plans and may even have contributed some advice. The same is true of the Chinese although their actual involvement was undoubtedly even less. It does seem extremely likely that the Chinese had advance knowledge of the September 30 Movement based on their close relations with the PKI and, to a lesser extent perhaps, with Sukarno and Subandrio. This is also indicated by the reported statements of some Indonesians who were in Peking on October 1 that the Chinese appeared to know more about the details of the September 30 Movement than had been publicly announced at the time. The Chinese reportedly said that some 40 generals were killed which coincides with reports that the original list of intended victims was at that level. All this is admittedly vague but it corroborates the probability of advance Chinese knowledge. As for direct Chinese assistance, there is less evidence although it does appear that Chinese arms were smuggled in with Conefo equipment. This is not 100 percent certain, of course, in view of the possibility of falsified evidence but the sources for such information were numerous and in some cases good ones.

In summary, we do not think the Chinese were a primary factor in the September 30 Movement or that Chinese activities were what the lawyers call a "proximate cause." The story of Mao's conversations with

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Aidit is palpably the work of someone's imagination and intelligent Indonesians privately scoff at such heavy-handed propaganda. More of the same is likely, however, given the general climate of opinion in Indonesia, the assumed need of the anti-Communists to whip up artificial issues in support of their continuing political offensive and the lack of sophistication of many propagandists which is only relatively greater here than in the more advanced countries of the world.

GREEN

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

P. 12. 12.

FILES
COMM
CHRON
AMB
MIN

Charge: Embassy

SECRET ~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 540A

This document consists of 4 pages.

Date: Oct 12, 1965

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7 PM

ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY 971

INFO : CINCPAC PRIORITY UNN
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

1. According German Embassy officer, Indo Army is now considering possibility of overthrowing Sukarno himself and is approaching several Western Embassies to let them know that such a move is possible.

2. Germany Embassy was informed on Oct 11 by reliable German businessman that he had been asked by Indo Army staff officer to act as intermediary to Indo German Embassy. /source said Sukarno received Army leaders on Oct 10 and latter presented him with sheaf of papers demonstrating PKI complicity in Sept 30 Movement. Sukarno refused to read these papers and upbraided Army for harassing PKI. Army generals then left with sense of deep frustration.

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PPRC, Japan

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

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Charge: Embassy

Classification

Control:

Date:

-2-

3. Australian Embassy has separate report that sheaf of papers presented to Sukarno by Army and that Sukarno refused to read it but Australian report indicates approach was made by Nasution alone on Oct 11. Press confirms that ~~Sukarno-~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ Nasution meeting did occur on Oct 11. Since initial contact of German businessman intermediary was made on morning of Oct 11, we believe that Nasution visit was follow-up and that two reports cover two different ^{reportedly} occasions on which Sukarno refused to read Army evidence.

4. Indo Army representative who contacted Germans said he was making approach under orders and was told to say that Indo Army was considering a quick move to depose Sukarno. He emphasized that they were only considering it and had not come to a decision. If it was done, it would be through a sudden move without warning and Sukarno would then be replaced by a combined civilian-military junta.

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Charge: SECRET Classification Control:
-3- Date:

5. The Indo Army representative said several Western Embassies would be approached but not Japanese since Japanese Ambassador regarded by Army as possibly being too close to Sukarno. Japanese Emboff has informed us independently today, however, that Japanese have received similar "low-level" approaches in name of Nasution and they understood that Indo Army was approaching several Western Embassies along same lines. We know of no other approaches at this time except for related comments to us reported Embtel 950.

6. Indo Army representative ~~to Germans~~ also indicated ^{to Germans} that Indo Army hoped for Western sympathy and economic help if Army does decide to depose Sukarno. Implication was that needed aid would be in form of food and possibly other supplies rather than financial help.

7. COMMENT: DefAtt was informed by Army contact on Oct 12 that Nasution and Saleh saw Sukarno separately and alone on Oct 10 to present evidence of PKI complicity. This source said Sukarno did listen to

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Date:

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evidence and acknowledged that PKI involvement in
Sept 30 Movement was indicated. Whether Sukarno
actually read documents remains questionable. It is
certain that some Army leaders are dissatisfied with
Sukarno's actions since Sept 30 but it not yet
established that they are considering ousting him.

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Foreign Service of the
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INCOMING

AMEMB DJAKARTA

Pol 12 PKI / ARMY

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Control: 260A

Recd: June 8, 1965
1:10PM

ACTION:
POL

FROM: MEDAN

INFO:
CHRON
CHARGE
ADCM
RF
ECON
POL
CT

NO: 509 June 7, 1965

ACTION: DJAKARTA 509 INFO DEPT 135

REF CONTEL 508 TO DJAKARTA 134 TO DEPT

Darjatmo decision regarding Tjahaja publication first public instance here where military has used PEPELRADA ~~XENXENKA~~ (DWIKORA) authority overrule Governor.

Instance chosen clear challenge to Governor and PKI; only last week Governor banned paper on grounds local authorities had not given approval prior publication. PKI controlled National Front, Youth Front, and PWI had publicly called for banning and cheered Governors decision. Darjatmo decision as published calls on Pantja Tunggal (local authorities) National Front, Youth Front and PWI by name to submit proof "if possible" to Darjatmo that license should be revoked.

Decision issued afternoon June 6 and timing following return of all Sumatra Commander Mokoginta from Djakarta morning June 6 too coincidental.

Governor and PKI undoubtedly maneuvering in Djakarta but Army clear winner in first skirmish.

GP-4.

BLACKBURN

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
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FILE



BL 12
PKI

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Secret

A-398

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SECSTATE WASHINGTON

GP-3 - Downgrade each
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matically declassified

INFO : BANGKOK, CINCPAC (for Polad),
KUALA LUMPUR, MEDAN, SINGAPORE,
SURABAJA

Amembassy DJAKARTA

December 17, 1965

PKI Leadership List and Fate of PKI Leaders

1. The Embassy has received a number of reports concerning arrests of prominent PKI leaders although the evidence is often suspect. There is widespread falsification of documents such as alleged confessions, some of which can be easily detected and some not. An example of this is the alleged Njono confession wherein Njono, a PKI Politburo member, appears to be unaware of the composition of the Politburo. His alleged remarks on the composition of the Politburo are based on the Politburo as it existed prior to May, 1965 Central Committee plenum and fail to take into account the promotion of Peris Pardede to be a candidate member of that body or the transfer of Rawang from leadership of the Central Java PKI to the Central Committee Secretariat.

2. Enclosed is an unclassified list of the PKI leadership bodies as they existed after the May, 1965 plenum when the last changes were made. Also enclosed is a (secret) fragmentary compilation of information on the present whereabouts of PKI leaders based on the limited information available.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Enclosures a/s

Mary Vance Trent
First Secretary of Embassy

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POL:RJMartens:efr 12/14/65 POL:MVTrent

FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure 1
A-393, Djakarta

POLITBURE

Full Members

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. D. N. Aidit | Chairman of CC |
| 2. M. H. Lukman | 1st Deputy Chairman of CC |
| 3. Njoto | 2nd Deputy Chairman of CC |
| 4. Sudisman | Head of Secretariat |
| 5. Sakirman | CC Economic Expert |
| 6. Njono | Member of Secretariat |
| 7. Jusuf Adjitorop | A Deputy Head of Secretariat
in China since July 1964 |
| 8. Rewang | Member of Secretariat |

Candidate Members

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 1. Anwar Sanusi | Member of Secretariat, PKI
rep. in National Front |
| 2. Peris Pardede | Deputy Head of Secretariat |

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Full Members

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Achmad Sunardi | ? |
| 2. Jusuf Adjitorop (Politburo) | A Deputy Head of Secretariat |
| 3. D. N. Aidit (Politburo) | Chairman of CC |
| 4. Amar Hanafiah | 1st Secy CDB, S. Kalimantan |
| 5. Anwar Kadir | A Deputy Head of Secretariat |
| 6. Anwar Sanusi (Cand.
Politburo) | Member of Secretariat, PKI rep.
in National Front |
| 7. Dahlan Rivai | Member of Secretariat |
| 8. Djokosudjono | Member of Secretariat (Head of
Planning Bureau) |
| 9. A. Imron | Secy CDB, S. Sumatra |
| 10. Ismail Bakri | Secy CDB, West Java |
| 11. M. H. Lukman (Politburo) | 1st Deputy Chairman of CC |
| 12. Muhammad Samikidin | Secy CDB, Atjeh |
| 13. Djalaludin Jusuf Nasution | Secy CDB, N. Sumatra |
| 14. Njono (Politburo) | Member of Secretariat |
| 15. Njoto (Politburo) | 2nd Deputy Chairman of CC |
| 16. Nungtjik | Head of PKI parliamentary faction |
| 17. Nursuhud | A Deputy Head of Secretariat |
| 18. Peris Pardede (Cand.
Politburo) | A Deputy Head of Secretariat |
| 19. Rewang (Politburo) | Member of Secretariat |
| 20. Ruslan Kamaludin | Member of Secretariat |

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Cont.)

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 21. Sakirman (Politburo) | CC Economic Expert |
| 22. Sidartojo | Member of Secretariat |
| 23. Siswojo | Member of Secretary (Head of Education Dept.) |
| 24. Sajid Ahmad Soefjan | Secy CDB, West Kalimantan |
| 25. Sudisman (Politburo) | Head of Secretariat |
| 26. Sudojo | Member daily council CDB, Djakarta Raya |
| 27. Nj. Suharti | Chairman, <u>Gerwani</u> and Head of Women's Dept. of Secretariat |
| 28. Sundjono | Member of Secretariat |
| 29. Karel Supit | Member of Secretariat (Head of Foreign Dept.) |
| 30. Suwardiningsih | Semi-retired |
| 31. Tjoa Tek Tjun | ? |
| 32. Tjugito | Member of Secretariat |
| 33. Wikana | Ranking PKI representative in '45 Generation |
| 34. M. Zaelani | Member of Secretariat |
| 35. Adenan Rachman | Secy, CDB Djarbi |
| 36. Abdullah Alihamy | Secy, CDB Riau |
| 37. Sajid Fachrul Baraqbah | Secy, CDB East Kalimantan |
| 38. Banda Warahap | Head, Dept. of Culture, CC PKI |
| 39. Ktut Kandel | Secy, CDB Bali |
| 40. Umar Lestelahu | Secy, CDB Maluku |
| 41. Aminuddin Muchlis | Secy, CDB South Sulawesi |
| 42. Muslimin Jasin | Secy, CDB West Nusantara |
| 43. Tobias Paulinus Rissi | Secy, CDB East Nusantara |
| 44. Sukatno | Secy General, <u>Pemuda Rakyat</u> and probably head of Youth Dept. of Secretariat |
| 45. Messer Tanggap Pelong | Secy, CDB Central Kalimantan |
| 46. M. A. Pane | Secy, CDB Lampung |
| 47. Rachmat | Secy, CDB West Sumatra |
| 48. Sidik Kertapati | A Deputy Head of BFI and probably head of Agriculture Dept. of Secretariat |
| 49. J. Suak | Secy, CDB North Sulawesi |
| 50. Suwandi | Secy, CDB East Java |

Candidate Members

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Anwar Nasution | Dep. Secy Gen., <u>Pemuda Rakyat</u> |
| 2. Nj. Setiati Surasto | 4th Deputy Chairman, SOBFI |
| 3. Nj. Sundari Ar | |
| 4. Thaib Adamy | Deputy Secy, CDB Atjeh |
| 5. Nj. Umi Sardjono | General Chairman, <u>Gerwani</u> |

UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

Enclosure 1
A-398, Djakarta

CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION

1. Peris Pardede (Chairman) Also Member of Secretariat & CC
2. Dahono
3. Mangkudun Sati
4. Suhaemi Rachman
5. Towidjan
6. Surja

CENTRAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

1. Sujono Pradigdo (Chairman)
2. Tambunan L. D. (Deputy Chairman)
3. Laurens Darman (Deputy Chairman)
4. Busjari Latif
5. Djodo Wirosubroto
6. Ngadiman Hardjosebroto
7. Singgih Tirtosubroto
8. Supeno
9. Tan Ling Dji
10. Ir. Thajeb Thaher
11. Djamhari
12. Nj. Mudjiatun
13. Drs. J. Piry

SECRETARIAT CC-PKI*

1. Sudisman (Head)
2. Jusuf Adjitorop (Deputy Head)
3. Anwar Kadir (Deputy Head)
4. Peris Pardede (Deputy Head)
5. Nursuhud (Deputy Head)
6. Anwar Sanusi (National Front)
7. Djokosudjono (Plans)
8. Siswojo (Education)
9. Karel Supit (Foreign Countries)
10. M. Zaelani
11. Njono
12. Tjugito
13. Ruslan Kamaludin
14. Dahlan Rivai
15. Rewang
16. Sundjono
17. Sidartojo

*Below are persons who have been named in the press as "Members of the Secretariat." The heads of several Secretariat Departments who have not been named as "Members of the Secretariat" are not included here.

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Enclosure 2
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REPORTS ON WHEREABOUTS OF PKI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS
AS OF DECEMBER 10

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. D. N. Aidit | Reported dead. |
| 2. Njoto | " " |
| 3. Lukman | " captured. |
| 4. Sudisman | Conflicting reports. Most recent are that he is loose. |
| 5. Sakirman | Reported arrested. |
| 6. Hjono | Known to be arrested and in a Djakarta prison. |
| 7. Rewang | Believed to be arrested, but only on basis of report that all Politburo members were arrested except Sudisman and Adjitorop. |
| 8. Anwar Sanusi | Believed to be arrested on same basis as Rewang. |
| 9. Peris Pardede | Captured in North Sumatra according to Army press release. |
| 10. Djalaludin Jusuf Nasution | Same as Pardede. |
| 11. Dahlan Rivai | Reported arrested by press. |
| 12. Umar Hanafiah | Believed to be arrested on basis of press reports which did not say he was in custody but implied it. |
| 13. Itat Kandel | Reported arrested by reliable source. |
| 14. Umar Lestelaku | Reported to have made anti-PKI statements by the press implying that he was under Army control. |

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15. Nursuhud Reported by press to be loose
 in mountains of West Sumatra.
16. Thaher Thajeb Identified by reliable source
 as in prison.
17. Tobias P. Rissi Arrested according to Spektrum
 Revolusi of November 17, 1965.
18. Jantje Suak Arrested according to Antara
 of December 1, 1965.

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Copy of letter from Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to:

Mr. Edwin L. Fox
P.O. Box 3512
Des Moines, Iowa.

Djakarta, August 5, 1965

Dear Mr. Fox:

I have been following with the greatest interest the course of events in Viet Nam, especially after the new, but now relatively old, turn which it has taken since the U.S. decision to extend the war, at least the air-raids to North Vietnam.

But what fascinates me even more than the new course of the war in Viet Nam, is the vehement debate among politicians, journalists, and academicians which the policy change has aroused throughout the U.S. The fact that so many not only intelligent and well-known but also bona-fide college professors and journalists - bona fide in the sense of not belonging to any group politically opposed to the present Government in power and who can therefore be regarded as quite sincere with regard to the motives for the promulgation of their views and the beliefs in the justness of their arguments - are taking part in this national debate, makes it the more fascinating but also .. perplexing!

Perplexing, because those bona-fide intellectuals are criticizing the U.S. Government along lines of argument based upon the belief that the United States is unable to win the war in Viet Nam and thus has to quit the country as soon as possible, even if it would be compelled to leave it as a prey to the communist Viet Cong and ultimately to North Vietnam. For - following their line of thought - continuing the war means not only that the U.S. cannot win the war in Viet Nam, but also that it will generate a third nuclear world-war in which ultimately no one will be the winner because of the wide-spread devastation and annihilation caused by nuclear weapons.

These views are especially perplexing to those - to whom I belong - who are equally sincerely convinced that the U.S. is following the only right path which leads, if not to a decisive military victory, at least to a necessary containment of aggressive communism within the borders as delineated by the existing international agreements (on Korea, Vietnam and Laos).

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Why is their defeatist, even if sincere judgment so perplexing to me? Because I believe, one needs not to be an Asian to know that to win a war one must first of all have the will to fight and win. This is not only true for small, weak nations, but also for mighty world-powers like the U.S.

But before waging a war one must first be convinced of the justness of the motives to engage upon such a war. And here we are touching on a moral or (religious) belief. I believe - and I don't think that one must be an Asian or a non-Christian to adhere to this belief - viz. that wars are justifiable only in case of self defense or the defense of law, i.e. international law and agreements. Not only are wars engaged upon in self-defense or for the protection and right functioning of international law and agreements justifiable, but in the face of aggressive atheism like communism, or any other aggressive ideology, wars in self-defense or for the protection of international law and agreements, are very often necessary. For these aggressive ideologies do not believe in God, human dignity and honor as the basis of law and agreements, but they believe in power and self-interest as the motor of human action. Thus, the abstention on the side of democratic nations - out of humane considerations - from the use of force to uphold agreements entered upon with the communist counterpart, will be regarded as a weakness by the latter and only invite them to further violations!

It should be noted that many leaders of countries which have just been liberated from colonial rule, tend to regard their former masters and their likes merely as imperialists whose actions are only motivated by self-interest and power. Therefore they become very often an easy prey of communist propaganda.

In "Time" of July 2, 1965, I read: "Above all", said General Mark Clark, "the 'Reds' must be made to feel the brunt of overwhelming force." Communists, he added, respect force and stop, look and listen when they see it."

I am glad that not only a general, but also a civilian like Mr. Averell Harriman, who knows the communists so well, is of the same, nay, even stronger opinion, as may be clear from the same Time issue

Dear Mr. Fox, as an Asian who has fought for the independence of his people and has suffered and is still suffering, together with untold millions, from the abuse of it by unscrupulous fellow countrymen, and whose main hope - I do not say only hope - lies in the willingness and capability of the United States to perform its obligations and to (help) win the war in Viet Nam - either by a complete military victory or by a

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political solution (agreement) with firm guarantees for the containment of the communists within the borders as assigned to them according to the Geneva agreements. I would like to ask the following questions to those who so vehemently, even if sincerely, criticize the U.S. Government.

Is the U.S.' presence in Viet Nam and the ensuing war against the Viet Cong, started long before the decision to extend the air raids to North Vietnam, due to "imperialistic" purposes of the U.S., or in fulfillment of its international obligations, especially its obligation towards the South Vietnamese people?

If the U.S.-presence in Vietnam and the ensuing war against the Viet Cong and its further extension to North Vietnam, the true Master of the Viet Cong, is due to the fulfillment of its international obligations, then a pulling out of the U.S. from South Vietnam without first establishing the necessary conditions to safeguard the peaceful continuation of South Vietnam (or its peaceful association or unification with North Vietnam) will undoubtedly be regarded:

(a) Throughout the free world as a breach of promise of the U.S. towards the Vietnamese people. This will most probably cause irreparable damage not only to the prestige of the U.S., but also to the foundations of such for the security of the U.S. and world peace so vital organizations as the Nato, Seato, etc. and

(b) Throughout the communist world and the newly independent countries which have recently been forced from colonial rule, as a great weakness of the U.S. which will considerably advance the influence and power and stimulate the aggressiveness of Chinese communism and its followers like the Indonesian communists.

Apart from the moral question, whether it is right for the U.S. to abandon the South Vietnamese people in violation of its treaty obligations, and the practical question whether the consequences of such an act would not be quite the reverse of what the critics of U.S.-policy in Vietnam probably expect from such a retreat of the U.S. from Vietnam, - viz. To prevent a much greater loss of American lives and property and to secure the safety of the U.S. -- the question may be put to those critics, what plausible reasons they can muster for their belief, that the U.S. cannot win the war in Vietnam.

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Nobody in the world, if he has a little knowledge of its history and the present national and international conditions, can or will believe, that the most powerful nation in the world, that has won the second world war, is not able to (help) win the war in Vietnam, except, if it is unwilling to fight further.

And as to the fear that further U.S. involvement and escalation of the war could generate an inhuman, devastating nuclear war, if this argument is earnestly accepted, then the U.S. might well stop to produce nuclear weapons, nay, it should immediately start to destroy its existing stock of nuclear arms. For that would be the best way and the only one to prevent the possibility for the outbreak of a nuclear war. Any present or future war contains necessarily the possibility of a nuclear ending, if it is indeed the serious intention of the nations in possession of nuclear arms, to make effective use of them in case of necessity.

The tragedy for mankind is not that it has now to face the possibility of nuclear wars, but that, in this 20th century, it is still plagued by the facts and possibilities of wars as such. But alas! so long as there are still nations, lead by individuals who do not believe in God, human goodwill and brotherhood as the basis for an effective rule of law in human affairs, either in national societies or between nations, the peace-loving nations have to accept the old adage: si vis pacem para bellum, even if it must be a bellum atomicum!

It is a tragedy that mankind is still haunted by the spectre of war, but it would be a still greater tragedy if powerful nations like the U.S. were not willing to use its power, actually or potentially, to its full effectiveness for the maintenance of peace through the functioning of international law and agreements.

With regard to the role and the use of power in general and by the U.S. in particular, I have the greatest admiration for the views of Mr. George McBundy as exposed in the "Time" issue of June 25, 1965. I think the fundamental idea in his view is based upon the well-known truth, that law, for its effective functioning needs the backing of force. Lack of such a backing by force makes law the target of abuse and ridicule. On the other hand, the use of force without the backing of law, makes such an act a barbarous violation of human rights. This is not only true for national law but is especially so for international law which lacks the backing of an adequate international force and thus,

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in many cases, might with more propriety be called international lawlessness!

As long as the United Nations, originally created to provide for the necessary power to enforce international law and thus to maintain world-peace, has not yet succeeded and apparently will not succeed under the prevailing international conditions, to attain its lofty aim, it is the duty of the United States and all peace-loving nations -- preferably within, but if necessary outside the scope of U.N. activities -- to check barbarism and preserve human values, i.e. human dignity and civilization, even at the risk of a nuclear war!

That sounds rather paradoxical if one takes into account the real possibility that in case of a nuclear war wide areas of the earth, including the big cities, will be wiped out, thus leaving not much of our civilization, while a great deal of the human race, especially the intellectually and economically advanced nations, will be considerably reduced in number.

But we must not forget that ultimately the most important thing is not the preservation of the entire physical human race or the entire visible civilization, but the maintenance of human values, the salvage of human i.e. divine dignity.

The duty of every human being who regards himself as the child or creature of God, is to resist evil even at the risk or the cost of his own death or annihilation. For ultimately, the preservation of the physical human race is not our task, the task of God's creatures, but God's own task, the task of the Creator who created us from "dust" or "nothing". Let God take care of his creation, and let man do his duty: to preserve, and if necessary, to fight for human dignity.

What is true for individuals is also true for nations: God-fearing, peace-loving nations should not shrink from their duty to protect the law in order to preserve peace and human dignity from fear for the terrible consequences of a nuclear war.

Out of the ravages of the second world war we saw the emergence of prosperous, democratic nations in Germany, Italy and Japan in the place of former totalitarian societies. So we need not doubt from suffering and death will emerge new, human life, if we are only willing to fight for its preservation like the Allied Nations have done in the second

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world war. If Hitler had won, nobody can tell what would have been the fate of mankind. It would surely have been a serious regression towards primordial barbarism. But that would be contrary to God's intentions and plans as we understand them in our conception of evolution (vide: Leconte Du Nouy, Human Destiny). Thus, the allied Nations were destined to win the second world war, because they carried the banner of human dignity and human values.

Therefore, I am convinced that the U.S. will continue to accomplish its historic duty in South Vietnam, like it has done in the past, in two world wars, in accordance with the course of Evolution. It must, and it will win.

Dear Mr. Fox, this is no flattery, but I have indeed the greatest confidence in your nation under its present leadership.

I don't know whether you share the views of the U.S. Government's critics like Walter Lipmann and Prof. Morgenthau, or agree with Mr. Johnson's policy. I guess and I hope that you endorse the Government's policy out of conviction. But if you happen to be opposed to it, then I hope that any arguments as outlined above, though far from complete, may contribute to change your mind, or in any case compel you to re-think the whole problem.

The battle in Viet Nam is in my opinion decisive for the security and future not only of the South Vietnamese people and the neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, but of the United States as well, nay, of all mankind. If the United States can convince friends and foes alike that it is prepared to use its entire power, including its nuclear "force de frappe" to meet and eventually defeat the North Vietnamese aggression, begun as a Viet Cong subversive infiltration, in violation of existing international agreements, then the chances are very real, that not only the Russians, but also the Chinese communists will grudgingly accept the rule of living in peaceful coexistence with others, non-communist and even capitalist countries. Thus the dangers for an outbreak of a nuclear war will be greatly checked.

The seemingly stubborn unwillingness of the North Vietnamese communists, backed by the Chinese and Russians, to enter upon peace-talks, despite the escalation of the war, and their threats to carry on the war for an indefinite period, should not deceive us. It belongs to the usual display of bluffs, threats and invectives which must necessarily

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accompany the political activities of ideologies which have only respect for power and look with the greatest disdain upon such human values as decency, honesty and humanity.

I am convinced, if the United States sticks to its present policy, and makes it abundantly clear that its sole purpose is to stop North Vietnamese aggression, but for that purpose is prepared to crush North Vietnam, and if necessary, use its entire military and economic power, then sooner or later, and I think rather soon than late, the Communists will accept President Johnson's offer to talk about peace.

As I have said before, upon the outcome of the battle in Vietnam depends the future world peace, the crucial question whether the communists, especially the Chinese Reds, will accept the rule of peaceful coexistence with non-communists, particularly capitalist countries.

If such a coexistence between communist and non-communist countries lasts long enough, the salient ideological and structural differences between communist and capitalist societies will gradually diminish: communist societies will become more human and open, and capitalist societies more socialized. In other words, in communist societies the rights and freedom of the individual will become increasingly acknowledged and respected, whereas in capitalist countries the State will gradually assume more powers toward the individual, especially with regard to property rights.

Thus, the several nations of the world will in the long run grow towards each other to form one mankind, willing to live under the rule of law. This is the line of evolution as indicated and necessitated (!) by the discovery of atomic energy and the possibility of travel and adventure in the world deep outside the earth. The detection of the tremendous possibilities, but also dangers of the microcosmos as contained in the atom and the mighty attraction imposed upon the human mind and imagination by the beckoning lights of the microcosmos, has made our good, old earth too small and too dangerous to tolerate the existence of quarrelsome and bellicose sovereign nations. (De Gaulle is a dinosaurian anachronism!)

Dear Mr. Fox, I hope the outpourings of my heart, meant more as a means of giving expression and outlet to my perplexity which I indicated before, than as an effort to convince you or anyone else who happens to disagree with the current U.S. policy in Vietnam, doesn't annoy you too much.

So much is at stake with the continuation or discontinuation of that policy - also and especially for Indonesia - that I cannot keep

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...ent, even if my voice is but that of a defeated rebel - but a fighter for human dignity and honor - at the mercy of his barbaric victor. Only because there is a real hope and possibility of change for the better for the suffering masses in Indonesia, if the U.S. can win in Vietnam and check the communist flood, did I decide to write you this letter to relate my view to you, even if it doesn't show you any new aspect of the problem. Maybe it doesn't contain any new argument and is therefore of no value intellectually, but as a moral support for the U.S. Government, coming from the suffering masses of Indonesia for whom I have stronger claims than Mr. Sukarno to act as their mouthpiece, my exposition may not be quite worthless - at least, if it could reach the proper responsible authorities through your intermediary.

Dear Mr. Fox, I heard that you had been transferred to Washington. If this is true, will you be so kind as to convey my highest regards to Mr. Rush? I made his acquaintance in 1955 (?) when he was still President of the Rockefeller Foundation on the introduction of Mr. John D. Rockefeller III. I believe I have mentioned this to you already.

And further, would you please also remember me to Mr. Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System and convey my respects to him? It is quite a long time since I met him for the last time, but I hope he still remembers me.

There are two persons about whom my wife and I have not heard anything for a long time and of whom we have always the most pleasant memories. Mr. and Mrs. John D. Rockefeller III. If you know them or happen to make their acquaintance, would you please tell them that we are always thinking of them and wondering when we would be able to meet them again and have an enjoyable chat at the dinner table.

And last but not least of all, will you and Mrs. Fox accept the sincere regards and affection of us who will never forget your kindness, generosity, help and understanding during the most difficult period of our life.

May God bless you and your family and may He give the leaders of your country the wisdom and courage required to steer the U.S. ship of State safely through the current stormy weather!

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Prawiranegara and family

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P.S. There is still one argument used to support the view that the U.S. should quit South Vietnam, which is too important to be passed without an answer. The argument runs: that South Vietnam has no stable government because it has no leader of national stature, and it has no national leaders because in fact the South Vietnamese do not constitute a nation, but is a loose conglomeration of very different ethnic and religious groups, hostile towards each other, and held together only by military power. If the South Vietnamese were given the freedom to choose between North and South Vietnam, their choice would certainly fall on North Vietnam.

This argument is unfair to the South Vietnamese and constitutes a reversal of facts. It is just because of North Vietnamese aggression and subversion that the South Vietnamese people are not able to choose their own leaders and form a government. And it is just to insure their right of self-determination that the U.S. has stepped in at the request of the legal - even if not quite representative- South Vietnamese Government, and has joined the war.

If such a freedom of self-determination will have been reached, it is absolutely uncertain, if the South Vietnamese people would be willing to join North Vietnam and accept its communist form of government. I think it more probable that they would prefer to continue their present independent status and choose their own, more democratic form of government under their own national leaders. And if then the North Vietnamese were equally free to choose between North and South Vietnam, I bet the North Vietnamese will join South Vietnam or form a similar more democratic government.

In Indonesia, too, if the people were free to choose, they would certainly prefer a more democratic government instead of the present totalitarian "guided democracy" which is ruining the country by all kinds of abuse and irresponsible experiments and adventures put together under the slogan "vivere pericoloso."

For I believe, not only is democracy more in accordance with human dignity and divine law, but just because of that, it will become the general form of government in the world of the future.

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FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GROUP 2 - EXEMPT

INFO:

BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, CINCPAC, CINCSARPAC, COMUSC, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAFPHIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AF Manila; Cdr. US Naval Forces Marianas; Cdr. 5th AS, Fuchu AS Japan; Co. 500th Intc. Grp.

Embassy JAKARTA

December 21, 1965

JOINT WEEKA NO. 48 48

This WEEKA covers the period December 13 to December 18, 1965

POLITICAL

1. Army Takes Another Round in Anti-Sukarno Campaign
2. PKI Repression
3. Left-Wing PKI Takes More Setbacks
4. Economic Measures

PSYCHOLOGICAL

5. US-Indo Relations

MILITARY

6. ROTI takes Over SPI
7. New EUSTAD Commander
8. Polish Attaches
9. Air Force Purges Begin

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POL:KYTrent/ECHowland:ds

ARMA-Col. Ethel

AIRA-Col. Slade

M.V. Trent

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From Djakarta

POLITICAL

1. Army Takes Another Round in Anti-Sukarno Campaign (SECRET)

a. The reporting week continued to witness striking Army success in drawing power under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Operations Command, or KOTI, which the Army intends will ultimately become a "super-Cabinet" enabling it to direct national policy. On December 10, a KOTI decree gave General Suharto the authority to appoint the members of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal which will try the leaders of the September 30 Movement, as well as to set court procedures and serve as prosecutor. A few days later, on December 14, General Suharto announced on the Palace steps that President Sukarno had appointed three Deputy Great Commanders of KOTI, namely, General Nasution for Military Affairs, Sultan Hamengkubuwono for Economic and General Affairs, and Ruslan Abdulgani for Social-Political Affairs. Subandrio, who had originally been slated to receive the "General Affairs" portfolio, was nowhere listed, and on the same day an item in Antara announced he would leave on a trip to the Netherlands after the beginning of the new year.

b. The Army thus appeared to have achieved all its objectives. But the real import of the Army's victory did not strike home until a few days later when, again on the Palace steps, Suharto announced that:

(i) The Central Intelligence Bureau (BPI), the Subandrio document-fabricating and general surveillance organization, will be withdrawn from the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and incorporated into the Army-run National Intelligence Command, a sub-division of KOTI.

(ii) The Supreme Economic Operations Command (KOTOK) will be dissolved, and along with the "Berdikari Operations Command" (KOTARI) will be incorporated into the Berdikari Development Command under Sultan Hamengkubuwono in KOTI. As well as another indication of the Army's increasing power, this announcement reflected the supersession of an earlier Army decision to keep its hands off the economy until its continuing difficulties had blackened the military's adversaries.

(iii) Certain Ministers suspected of involvement in the September 30 Movement will be tried as "rebels." Suharto's reading of this announcement, according to an eye-witness, sent panic through the ranks of Ministers who habitually turn up at the Palace every morning for Sukarno's daily Koffe-kiatsch.

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(iv) The "Dwikora volunteers" said to be 21 million strong but actually more in the vicinity of 40,000 to 50,000, will henceforth be supervised by a special IKTI section. Although this is not too clear, it appears to take the responsibility for these volunteers---an important percentage of whom were controlled by the FFI---away from the National Front, an organization which appears to be on its last legs anyway.

2. PFI Repression (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. Although Sukarno went to his most vitriolic and angry lengths to demonstrate his disagreement with the present campaign of repression against the PFI---even threatening again to resign if the "jolts" were not stopped---it didn't do a bit of good. The "jolts", which have now resulted in an estimated 100,000 PFI deaths, continued, as did the issuance of more statements by politicians and youth groups denouncing the idea of any resurgent Marxist-Leninist Party, as well as reports that all members of the PFI politburo are now dead or in custody except for one said to be out of the country, and one who disappeared in August. Not surprisingly, reliable reports indicate that the PFI---what is left of it---is rapidly losing confidence in Sukarno's ability to protect it, and may resort to active defense if the situation does not improve by December 24. It is not likely to improve, but what capability the PFI will have to begin "active defense" by that date is quite problematical.

b. A reliable Balinese source informed the Embassy that PFI deaths on the island of Bali now total about 10,000, and include the parents and even distant relatives of crypto-Communist Governor Sutedja, who fled with his wife to Jakarta after his house was burned down by demonstrators. Killing is continuing on the island, which had a strong PFI and a right-wing PFI which opposed it.

3. Left-Wing PFI Takes More Potholes (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Sukarno-supported, left-wing PFI led by Ali Bastoamidjojo and Ir. Surachman appears to have suffered sharp defeats this week in its duel with the ousted Hardi-Hadisubono faction to control the PFI. According to the Hardi faction's newspaper Borita Republik, John Luminkewas, Deputy Secretary General of the PFI and a chief Surachman hatchet-man, was arrested along with four other suspected Communist infiltrators of the PFI. Moreover, although this is not completely confirmed, it appears that West Java Military

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Commander General Adjie withdrew his permission for the left-wing FNI to hold a "Working Body Meeting" in Bandung December 18-20 which was ordered by Sukarno to conclusively oust the Hardi-Hardisubeno faction from the party. It is true the meeting was not held, but the cause is not yet known; if it is true that Adjie has deserted Sukarno, the President has lost the only real military ally he had left.

4. Economic Measures (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. Long-awaited measures to improve the state of the Indonesian economy began to appear during the reporting week. The preceding week, President Sukarno had confined 24 economic Ministers to a villa in the resort area of Tjipanas with instructions not to emerge without an economic program. The Army, at that time, was cool toward these proceedings, and was said to have taken a decision to keep its hands off the economy in order to allow its growing slide toward chaos/blacken the image of its adversaries.

b. The first concrete results of the Tjipanas meetings came on December 13, when Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh announced that all currency in circulation will be replaced by new currency at a rate of 1,000 rupiah of old money to 1 rupiah of the new. The announcement sent a jolt through the markets for a day or two, but following some stern exhortations against price-raising and store-closing, things seemed to have calmed down by December 17, with prices only slightly above the previous normal.

c. The Army, which had first opposed this step, is now said to be behind it; Sultan Hamengkubuwono himself, the new Deputy Great Commander for Economic Affairs of EOTI, is even said to favor devaluation, as well as other new regulations believed to be ready for announcement.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

5. US-Indo Relations (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. Relations continue to hinge specifically on the position of the American oil companies and on Indonesian feelings for American aid (UNRRA No. 47). In more general terms of course the overall political developments, now accelerating at such a speed that some significant early resolution seems inevitable, remain of dominating importance.

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b. The change of atmosphere in relations between Indonesians and Americans has been conspicuous and increasingly warm cordiality has been evident in social gatherings as well as in more quiet contacts during the week. Indonesians not seen for months now freely greet American friends on public occasions. The passing of old posters and signs directed viciously against the US, sometimes along with other "Mekolim" powers, continues to strike us as evidence of the new day. Although the removal of such signs of the old regime is not complete, the former eyesores are greatly reduced. At Senajan sports hall when Sukarno, appearing in that large arena for the first time since Gestapu, addressed the 20th anniversary meeting of the women's Perwari organization on December 17, there was no sign of such former garish propaganda as caricatures of Uncle Sam and similar tasteless and hostile presentations which used to accompany the Bung's appearances. His attempt to rekindle his old oratory and to evoke the former ovations failed dismally in the new atmosphere.

c. There are signs everywhere of re-awakened intellectual curiosity as to what is going on in the outside world and especially is there an insatiable interest in what others think about Indonesian developments. People are hungry for US newspapers, magazines, books and contacts. In the fantastic switch which has occurred over ten short weeks the Embassy is busily doing what it can to meet the need and to take advantage of new opportunities which a short time ago would have seemed impossible. While the press in general remains centered, not surprisingly, on internal developments, it has given good play to the extraordinary Gemini achievements of the past week, and the Foreign Department's Herald of December 20 front-pages story under the head "Record Breaking Gemini 7 Returns." Editorials in the same issue nevertheless regret that the United States, so advanced scientifically, is behind the times in its policy on Vietnam. But Antara, long one of our most articulate and harmful enemies, now under new Army-controlled management, has taken the occasion to emphasize what it has seen as hopeful signs for improved US-Indonesian relations, based on Ambassador Green's call on Suwito last week. On the whole, a fresh breeze is blowing.

ARMY

6. KOTI Takes Over BPI (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. General Suharto, Army Commander and Chief of Staff of KOTI announced December 18 that the Central Intelligence Body (BPI) will be

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From Jakarta

merged into the National Intelligence Command (KIN) which is subordinate to EOTI.

b. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The EPI had been, in fact, Foreign Minister Subandrio's private intelligence organization.

7. New KOSTRAD Commander (UNCLASSIFIED):

Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the former Military Commander of KODAM V (Greater Jakarta), was installed as the Commander of the Strategic Army Command (KOSTRAD) on December 7.

8. Polish Attaches (UNCLASSIFIED):

a. Polish military attaches are accredited to Indonesia for the first time. Colonel Wacław Mruglaski, Armor, and Major Yan Bietajec, Signal, recently made their first public appearances. Both officers are accompanied by their families, and are on three year tours.

b. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): Bietajec has not participated in official calls and may remain in the background. Both officers seem to be attempting to cultivate U.S. Attaches. They look on their tours in Indonesia with foreboding.

AIR FORCE

9. Air Force Purges Begin (CONFIDENTIAL):

As his first official act after being sworn in as new Air Force Minister, Sri Muljono Heriambang announced the retooling of Deputy Minister for Operations and Intelligence Devanto, who may go to Moscow as Air Attache after a brief, face-saving period in the status of "attached to the Minister." The two Deputy Minister slots he held will now be occupied by the former Air Attaches to Canberra and Moscow.

For the Ambassador:

7.11.55
Mary Vance Trent
First Secretary of Embassy

SECRET

C.F. POL 2-1
Secret

This document consists of 6 pages.
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FILE

A-373

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GROUP 2 - EXEMPT

INFO : BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, CINCPAC, COMUSARPAC, COMUSCIB, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVPHIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AF Manila; Cdr. US Nav. Forces Marianas; Cdr. 5th AS, Fuchu, AS, Japan; Co. 500th Intc. Grp.

Amembassy DJAKARTA

December 7, 1965

JOINT WEEKLY NO. 46

This Week Covers the Period November 25 to December 3, 1965

POLITICAL

1. Army-Sukarno Struggle
2. Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists
3. Relations with China
4. Confrontation in the News
5. Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned
6. U.S. Relations

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

SECRET

**POL: MVTrent/RJMartens/RGRichJr/
ECHowland/ds**

POL: RJMartens

Secret

SECRET

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From Djakarta

POLITICAL

1. Army-Sukarno Struggle (SECRET)

The struggle for power between Sukarno and Military leaders entered a quiet phase this week, with little political maneuvering evident at the surface. The Army concentrated on strengthening its position in the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) which began to extend its authority in the field of the economy. The situation in the press was relatively quiet, as Minister of Information Achmadi's new press regulations went into effect and were observed by all papers except the split PNI journals. Omar Dani was finally replaced as head of the Air Force by his pro-Communist deputy Sri Muljono Herlambang, a move taken without the concurrence of the Army which is said to have angered Nasution. Several ministerial pro-Communists were reportedly placed under city arrest during the week. By the end of the week, Sukarno had called a session of the MPRS, theoretically Indonesia's highest ranking policy-making body, for December 6; however, it was indicated that he would not deliver his "political solution" to the September 30 Affair at this meeting.

2. Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. Information received from a number of high-ranking and well-placed sources indicate that PKI leader D.N. Aidit was captured in Central Java on November 21 and killed after "resisting interrogation" or "attempting to escape." The Indonesian press has also subsequently carried reports to this effect. There is some evidence that Aidit may have been captured as early as mid-October and been under secret interrogation in Bandung and that Army reports of his subsequent presence in Central Java were intended to mislead Sukarno. In any event the recent reports indicate that Aidit is almost certainly dead now, whenever he may have been captured.

b. The Embassy has also received several reports from well-placed sources that PKI First Deputy Chairman Lukman and the pro-Communist Governor of North Sumatra, Sitepu, have been arrested and are in prison. After a flurry of rumors that Njoto, the PKI Second Deputy Chairman and a Sukarno protege, had been arrested, more recent reports indicate that he was not and that he may still be under Presidential protection. (On the other hand, the later reports may be Army-inspired fabrications designed to prevent Sukarno from acting effectively to secure Njoto's release if the latter is imprisoned). There are also reports from well-placed and reliable sources that a number of prominent crypto-Communists have been placed under house arrest including the (left-wing) PNI Secretary General, Surachman, and the

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From Djakarta

Minister of Central Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam.

c. The Army's willingness to arrest PKI leaders under Sukarno's personal protection and to restrict to house arrest crypto-Communist cabinet ministers weakens Sukarno further and shows an Army determination to challenge him more directly than heretofore. Reports from various sources indicate that most of the PKI Politburo have been captured by now although the solidity of our information varies from case to case and no information has been heard at all concerning one Politburo member (Rawang). The countdown now reads: Aidit - believed dead, Lukman - believed to be in prison; Njoto - status unclear but may be arrested, Sudisman - believed in prison, Sakirman - believed in prison, Adjitorop - in Peking since July, 1964, Njono - definitely in prison, Rawang - unknown. The whereabouts of two Politburo candidate members and most Central Committee members are not known but it is likely that most were arrested and/or killed by the Army. A few are known to be in hiding.

d. As for lower level repression of the PKI, Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito told the DCM that there are now 34,000 PKI prisoners in Java alone. The slow extension of provincial bans continued as the PKI was dissolved in West Kalimantan, the Karo Batak area of North Sumatra and in the Jogjakarta Special Area.

3. Relations with China (CONFIDENTIAL)

The recently uncertain course of Sino-Indonesian relations took a turn for the worse again this week. Liquid assets of Chinese-origin residents of Indonesia were confiscated in several provinces, and Minister of Agriculture Sudjarwo announced that regional military commanders would take over all rice mills and textile enterprises owned by members of the Chinese community association Baperki. Perhaps in retaliation for these and other acts of economic repression, NCNA announced December 4 that Communist China was suspending trade relations with Indonesia. The Chinese Ambassador presented several more protests to Dr. Subandrio, who maintained that Sino-Indonesian relations were in the process of "normalizing." This is patently not the case.

4. Confrontation in the News (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. After several weeks in which Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia has been mostly notable from its absence from public attention,

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From Djakarta

the Foreign Ministry-controlled Indonesian Herald this week single handedly campaigned to condemn alleged British atrocities against guerrilla fighters in North Borneo. For three days the Herald printed atrocity pictures and stories, but the vernacular press continued its preoccupation with domestic events and has not picked up the theme.

b. In what may be a further effort to stimulate attention on foreign affairs, several claims of Indonesian victories along the border have also appeared in the press. Subandrio once more hinted at "negotiations" on December 1 when he commented to the press that Indonesia would not reject an opportunity to exchange ideas with the British concerning Malaysia. Subandrio also claimed that with the elimination of the PKI Indonesia was now free to pursue confrontation more vigorously.

c. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The atrocity stories seem mostly designed to make the continuing atrocities committed against rival political factions within Indonesia following the abortive September 30 coup seem less reprehensible, by pointing the finger at alleged barbarity elsewhere. The slightly increased press attention in general may also be partly related to the December 6 anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1961 by the Indonesian puppet government of the "Unitary State of North Kalimantan." No significant increase in physical confrontation appears in the cards, however, and, except for the Palace and Subandrio, most Indonesian leaders now seem inclined to work toward the eventual dismantlement of confrontation.

5. Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. On November 26, the Indonesian rubber-stamp Parliament (DPNKR) "unanimously" issued a statement condemning Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and accusing the British of having manipulated this result. Accepting the resolution on behalf of the Government, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that it was the Government's conclusion that Britain had plotted with Smith to achieve the independence of the racist Rhodesian regime and announced that Indonesia would extend no recognition to Smith but would extend recognition to "Zimbabwe" if African political leaders declared independence.

b. COMMENT (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE): Editorial and other comment on Rhodesian developments has been relatively sparse, reflecting the major preoccupation of both the press and the politicians at present with domestic Indonesian political developments. Such statements as have been

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issued, however, have made an effort to blame Britain for the situation, consonant with the Indonesian stereotype of the British as, at best, "neo-colonialists". Unlike many AA countries, Indonesia has announced no sanctions or trade restrictions with Rhodesia and it seems likely that for the time being Indonesian involvement in this African issue will be minimal. Should internal Indonesian politics stabilize while Rhodesia still survives under a minority white government, however, Indonesia may yet attempt to assume a position of demagogic leadership over this issue in line with her self-image.

6. U.S. Relations (SECRET)

a. Appearance of Sukarno's autobiography.

i. During the week US-Indonesian relations seemed to find their most conspicuous expression through the publication and attendant publicity of the autobiography of Sukarno as told to the American writer, Mrs. Cindy Adams. Especially conspicuous and flamboyant was the treatment given the subject by the Foreign Department's Indonesian Herald which lauded the book and felt that here at last was an American who understood Sukarno and Indonesia. The paper printed accounts of cocktail parties sponsored by Ambassador Palar to mark the publication of the book and in general established the full approval of Subandrio's Foreign Department for the project.

ii. The Indonesian-language press on the other hand paid little heed to the book. Its publication was conservatively noted but without excessive comment.

iii. COMMENT: We understand directly from Mrs. Ganis Harsono, wife of the Second Deputy Foreign Minister, that not only she and her husband but also both Subandrios have read and were delighted with the book. Sukarno has not been heard from publicly on the subject.

b. Official Calls

During the past week both the Ambassador and DCM have had occasion (the latter in the course of making farewells) to call on several cabinet ministers. This marks what may be the opening of a possibility of dialogue between responsible officials of the two governments, - a possibility which did not exist during the past several weeks in the wake of Gestapu.

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From Djakarta

c. Indonesian Approaches

From an increasing number of Indonesians we are receiving approaches, not yet worked out in detail and often quite vague in expression, for economic assistance. Both civilian and military elements foresee coming crises in January-February before the new rice harvest will be reaped and the Lebaran holiday will increase demand. The US posture is to listen while keeping the door open for possible future consideration when circumstances warrant.


PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative.

MILITARY

Negative.

For the Ambassador:



Robert J. Martens
First Secretary of Embassy

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Secret
SECRET

A-353

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GROUP 2 - EXEMPT

SEC STATE WASHINGTON

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November 30, 1965

Amembassy DJAKARTA

JOINT WEEKA NO. 45

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 67289

This Weeka covers the period November 15 - 24.

POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL-MILITARY

1. Army-Sukarno Tug-of-War and its Ramifications

A. The semi-overt struggle between Sukarno and military leaders for ultimate political power in Indonesia remained in the center of the stage during the reporting period, although it became increasingly apparent that under cover of this dispute, changes were occurring pointing toward the growth of more freedom to criticize and operate politically for moderate elements long submerged by the Sukarno-PRI forces.

B. In a series of meetings with youth leaders from several parties, General Nasution expressed his determination early last week to continue the campaign to repress the PKI, which has reached the stage of mass executions in several Indonesian provinces, apparently at the behest of General Suharto in Central Java at least. Nasution rejected the youth's demands for the Army to move directly against Sukarno, however, indicating that this would open the military to charges that a Generals' Coup had been planned for October 5, as the 30th September Movement had claimed. He indicated that the military had a plan of action, although he did not explain further, and from other reports it appears the Army may have a time schedule of from four to six months for toppling or at least totally neutralizing Sukarno.

C. Part of this plan may have been embodied in several military victories during the week which demonstrated the Army's

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Secret

strength and Sukarno's weakness. On November 15, Sukarno met with Nasution and the four service chiefs. Following the meeting, General Suharto announced that all regional and unit armed forces commanders were being called to Bogor Palace the following Saturday for an address by Sukarno. Suharto also announced that the proposed reorganization of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) had been prepared, and would be announced during the week at a "special occasion," giving rise to belief that Saturday would provide the occasion. On Friday, West Java Army Commander Adjie with a tortuously-worded statement effectively banned the PKI and Baperki in his district, thus giving rise to speculation that Sukarno had finally agreed to do the same for all Indonesia, since Adjie's close relationship to Sukarno is widely known. However, there were rumors during the week that Sukarno had attempted (with unknown success) to bribe some of the Moslem party leaders to drop the attack on the PKI. It was also reported that he had threatened to ban two other parties, IP-KI and the PSII, instead if they did not stop "arousing emotions," a Sukarno euphemism for attacking Subandrio and the PKI.

D. But on the appointed day, Sukarno did no more than deliver a petulant, megalomaniac speech in which he threatened to arrest reporters if they continued "arousing emotions," lectured the military commanders on the nature of the Indonesian revolution, and attempted to restore and gild his image as the sole spokesman of the Indonesian people. The military officers present - 387 in number - generally believed the meeting to be useless, although it did provide them an opportunity to consult each other. Some commanders reportedly expressed the opinion that Sukarno was batty. And two days later General Suharto "inaugurated" a "new-style" KOTI staff in which the names of Sukarnoites Subandrio, Achmadi and Jusuf Muda Dalam, formerly chairmen of staff groups, did not appear. Although a leading anti-communist general was also excluded, the symbolic importance of this exercise lay in the Army's success in removing their adversaries from a key policy-implementation body.

E. There were a number of other areas where the Army displayed strength at Sukarno's expense. Although at Sukarno's order Djakarta Military Commander Umar had relinquished his War Administrator (Peperda) status the preceding week, ~~and Sukarno's order~~ he announced that the regulations and tasks to be implemented in his normal status as "Dwikora Executive" would remain the same as during the State of War. This appeared to be the case, as the Army continued to round up and arrest communists, demonstrate its partial control of the information media, and, at one point, provide protection to a vocal anti-Subandrio agent who had been arrested at the Palace's orders. Umar also reportedly prevented the occurrence of several pro-Subandrio demonstrations planned by Achmadi, and issued an order that all political activities of university students would henceforth be conducted under the aegis of the anti-communist association "KAMI," rather than by other leftist-infiltrated organizations.

F. Meanwhile, both in the provinces and Djakarta, repression of the PKI continued, with the main problem that of what to feed and where to house the prisoners. Many provinces appear to be successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners, or by killing them before they are captured, a task in which Moslem youth groups are providing assistance. There were several rumors that Njoto, Oei Tjoe Tat, Lukman, Armananto, and other high-ranking communists or sympathizers are now in Army hands, and this may be true in some cases. There were no indications that PKI resistance has been significant in any provinces where major purges are being pursued, although indications of trouble in some parts of Sumatra have been registered. If all figures received are added up, a total of anywhere from 5,000-10,000 PKI leaders and activists have been reported executed in recent weeks, although this is probably grossly exaggerated.

G. One of the key fields in which the struggle between Sukarno and the Army-moderate-Moslem side broke through to the surface is that of the Djakarta press. At his speech on Saturday, the President devoted a majority of his time to the press, accusing inter alia General Sukendro's Api and General Sugandhi's Djakarta Daily Mail of having attacked "Nefo comrades" North Vietnam and Cambodia. Api immediately carried a denial of the President's words in the Saturday afternoon edition of its "weekly" and that night, at a "friendly gathering" hosted by the President for reporters at Bogor, offered to lock itself up if his words were true. According to Antara, the President back-tracked, and corrected himself, thus performing like Subandrio who several weeks earlier had accused several newspapers of being financed by the CIA, then retracted his remark under pressure. Api's confronting Sukarno, Sukarno's retracting his words, and Antara's printing the item are all examples of the phenomenal changes that have recently taken place in Indonesia. A day later, however, Api admitted it had attacked North Vietnam, and retracted its denial.

H. Another key aspect of the press hassle has been Information Minister Achmadi's confused behavior after issuing a series of press regulations at Sukarno's orders in an attempt to dampen the efforts of the anti-communist forces. Faced with mounting protests by political parties, Achmadi has wavered back and forth in such a confusing manner that his authority to supervise the press field seems grievously weakened. In conjunction with the increasing tendency of the press to raise its sights toward Sukarno, here was another admission of political weakness for the Palace forces. The final touch was added when Api carried a long editorial praising the Sultan of Jogjakarta, whose status as a possible Sukarno replacement and even rival is a matter of wide though never publicly stated knowledge in Indonesia. According to reports, Api, if it is not banned by Saturday, intends to carry in its weekly an article recommending a return to the true provisions of the 1945 Constitution, which limits the President to a five-year term and provides for a Vice-President.

~~SECRET~~

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From Djakarta

I. Among other events of significance during the week were the banning of the PKI in the province of Maluku, the "retooling" of pro-communist Governor Sitepu of North Sumatra, the transfer of "Daikora Executive" authority in Bali from the Governor (a crypto-communist) to the Military Commander (a leftist) and the growing strength of the expelled right-wing leaders of the PNI, who are now publishing their own newspaper and apparently garnering support among PNI branches disaffected with the pro-communist Ali Sastroamidjojo leadership. An anti-Chinese riot in Makassar reportedly caused the destruction, without looting, of 90 percent of the Chinese homes and shops in that city, and resulted in two more Chicom protests and the imposition of a strict curfew by the military commander of that region. Relations with the Chinese Communists continued very chilly during the reporting period, despite efforts by Subandrio and Sukarno to gloss things over. All Chinese technicians have been withdrawn from the Cenefo project, and both trade and aid are at a standstill.

J. Underlying the events of the week has been the growth of a new atmosphere in Djakarta, which though barely perceptible at this time, gives promise of taking hold. The apparent readiness of the Army, Moslems, and other moderates to disobey Sukarno in overt as well as subtle ways has helped to dissipate the pall of fear and suspicion which has shrouded this city for so long, and with the PKI in disarray, groups which in the past would have been too paralyzed to operate politically are emerging into the open. Evidences of these significant developments show up in various ways. A campaign is just beginning which, if it succeeds, may lead to the showing of American movies in Indonesia; even such a pro-Sukarno organ as the Indonesian Herald has editorialized that both anti-imperialist and pro-imperialist books should be available so that readers may formulate opinions based on "philosophical truth." The thrust of the Indonesian revolution toward totalitarian controls on expression and behavior has clearly stalled; as time passes, it will be increasingly difficult for Sukarno to start it rolling again.

For the Ambassador:

Edward E. Masters
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO 96601

SECRET

October 23, 1965

Dear Marshall:

Now that Colonel Untung is undone, I have been interested in following the developing confrontation between the Army and the PKI. Chuck Flowerree and I were particularly interested in your telegram no. 1098 to the Department, which reviewed the resources which the PKI might be able to mobilize in a major insurgency effort against the Army. As you say, there is no real evidence that the PKI has decided or will decide to go into insurgency but they do have contingency plans. The question that arises in our minds is whether we should accordingly be doing some contingency thinking about the possibility that if the PKI should go into insurgency, the Indonesian Army might at some point request U.S. assistance.

I have read your message 1160 in which you replied to the Department's 491 by saying that "if the military authorities ever really need our help in this matter, they would let us know." I certainly agree with your advice against taking soundings at this time. However, I wonder how we could respond if the Indonesian military really would ask us for help.

I suppose it would depend to a large extent on the way in which the insurgency developed, i.e. whether it followed the pattern of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and whether it produced some rough front line with the PKI in control of certain large identifiable areas. It would also depend on the role of Sukarno as well as many other factors. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate on the possibility that either with or without Sukarno as their front man, the Indonesian Army, being hard pressed in a war with the PKI might request our help. I

The Honorable
Marshall Green,
American Ambassador,
Djakarta.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 67289

SECRET

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suppose a request for help might include anything from covert operations and assistance on up through the spectrum, including transport, money, communications equipment, or arms.

Perhaps it is premature to raise this question and perhaps the situation is so fluid that it is almost impossible to estimate the future course. Nevertheless, if there is a reasonable possibility that the Indonesian Army might request our help against a PKI insurgency, then I suppose it would not hurt to consider how we would respond. I am sure all of these things are in your mind but if there is anything you or someone on your staff could tell me on this score, then I would certainly be appreciative.

Sincerely,



Norman B. Hannah
Political Adviser to CINCPAC

P.S. I've just seen your 1169 to the Dept. which both underlines the possibility and casts doubt on the reliability of the Army's gloom. But maybe the Army is softening us up for ~~the~~ an early request for aid.



SECRET

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

P. 22

CONFIDENTIAL

Charge: Embassy

Classification

Control: 1025A

Date: Nov 30, 1965
12:30 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1591
INFO : AMCONSUL HONG KONG 201
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 33
AMEMBASSY WARSAW ONE

1. Polish First Secretary Andrzej Grawziuk told EmbOff he had talked to PKI Central Committee member at 8:00 A.M. on October 1. PKI source was elated, knowing that Sept 30 Movement then underway. PKI source told Grawziuk, "This is what we've been waiting for." He said not all of PKI Central Committee knew about plot, only "special group" headed by Aidit.

2. According this source, idea originated outside PKI (presumably Sukarno although this not stated) and Aidit presented proposal to group from Central Committee (presumably Politburo, possibly supplemented by other key CC members). PKI leaders agreed to participate on condition that PKI as

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Foreign Service of the
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Control:

-2-

Date:

organization would not be involved and that only objective was intra-government operation to seize limited group of top generals. Source claimed there was no intention to kill generals. PKI source added that Sukarno was supposed to come out with statement on October 1 alleging suppression of Generals' Council plot.

3. Gradziuk said he believes PKI had become so dependent on taking orders from Sukarno that it was subsequently paralyzed when Sukarno failed to act. On other hand, he thought Sukarno was gradually reasserting control and might still win out (This line may have been designed to solicit EmbOff's opinion, however).

4. Source thought Chinese saw present picture in black and white terms and really did not have clear idea of what happened or forces at work. He said Chicoms believe it is simple matter of reactionary Army on one side and temporarily defeated PKI on other with

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Date:

Sukarno no longer important factor. Chicoms see no importance in cultivating middle forces. They feel Sukarno was untrustworthy ally who let PKI down (Although not explicitly stated, corollary of this analysis would be that Chinese felt PKI internal strategy wrong all along and are assuming I told you so attitude).

5. Gradziuk felt Soviets saw more complex situation but he was unwilling or unable to express himself so clearly on Soviet attitudes. He did say that Soviets were disturbed that Army targets extended beyond PKI itself to "other progressive groups," attitude implicitly shared by source. Gradziuk was particularly interested in soliciting EmbOff opinion on feasibility of forming new Communist Party. This question also posed by Soviet counselor in separate conversation with EmbOff and may indicate that it is at center of Soviet attention. In reply to question, Gradziuk said he did not think Soviets

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PPRC, Japan

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Control:

-4-

Date:

knew where Indo Army going politically and did not feel they were in position to talk seriously to Army on political matters at this time in view of confused situation.

6. In brief separate conversation, Soviet Political Counselor

~~EmbOff~~ said he could not understand why PKI did not

act in face of repression by Army. "Why, why, why?"

he repeated. EmbOff answered with Polish argument

that PKI may be immobilized by long habit of obeying
counselor

Sukarno. Soviet ~~officer~~ responded that PKI may think

Sukarno is with them but it is obvious he is only

trying to save himself and no longer cares what

happens to PKI, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

7. Comment: It is possible that Polish EmbOff's story was doctored to protect PKI or to appear cooperative. Source is long-time acquaintance, however, and appears highly Western-oriented and sympathetic to progressive non-Communism. On other hand, he is

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Charge: Embassy

Classification

Control:

-5-

Date:

believed to be intelligence officer and is
undoubtedly a good one.

GP-4.

GREEN

mg

POL:EE Masters

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RM
POL:RJ Martens:efr
11/30/65

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